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For the EU, the qualitative change is that case of Ukraine 
is shifting from being a transit issue into a ‘solidarity chal-
lenge’. For obvious political but also commercial reasons, 
European companies have carried out reverse-flow activities 
which could reach 17bcm/annually. However, that gas actu-
ally originates from Russia and relies on the European mar-
ket’s gas stocks. If for any reason Russian deliveries through 
Ukraine are halted or generally curbed, reverse-flow deliv-
eries would become politically and economically difficult, 
because the gas will be needed in the EU.
The solidarity challenge extends far beyond this winter 
because the structural and systemic problems of Ukraine 
are paramount issues. Aside from managing the immediate 
crisis, however, assistance can hardly be extended into the 
future without conditionality and monitoring the necessary 
reforms. As a member of the Energy Community Ukraine will 
have to fully implement the legal acts of the EU Energy Acquis 
Communautaire. This will also require a new transport and 
storage scheme. How this will affect the supply-security 
equation of both, Ukraine and the EU, remains to be seen. 
Second Piece in the Puzzle: Russian–EU Relations: 
Loss of Trust, Lack of Reliability?
The annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Eastern 
Ukraine have resulted in a severe crisis of confidence between 
Russia and the EU, in turn shaking up the political order 
on the continent as a whole. Mistrust, misperceptions and 
misunderstandings reign on both sides. Economic sanctions 
aggravate the discord. Because of the deterioration in politi-
cal relations, Russian gas supplies are no longer perceived 
as reliable by the political elite in the EU – fears that Russia 
will use natural gas deliveries as a political tool grow more 
pronounced, whereas voices noting that Russia has never cut 
off a (well-) paying customer become more subdued. 
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At the end of 2014 the European energy landscape looks 
much different from that a year ago: Russian Crimea annexa-
tion, military conflict and continuing destabilization in East-
ern Ukraine have brought a sharp deterioration in overall 
political relations with Russia. The fall-out on EU energy 
policy is severe: geopolitics and (over)-securitization have 
come to prevail over economic interests or climate concerns. 
As the image of natural gas is flawed, this has implications 
for natural gas policies and relations with other major sup-
pliers, Norway among them. The European gas puzzle con-
sists of many pieces, and the picture is sketchy as multilevel 
gas politics continue to unfold. A blueprint of how the EU 
wants to see the pieces fit together is needed.
First Piece in the Puzzle: Ukraine – From Transit Issue 
to Solidarity Issue?
Ukraine still hosts the largest transport corridor for Russian 
gas deliveries to Europe. In 2014, roughly 40% of Russia’s 
160 bcm of natural gas exports have passed through Ukraine 
to Europe. Transit is functioning normally, but supplies to 
Ukraine have become a pressing issue.
Over the course of 2013/2014 gas relations between Mos-
cow and Kiev have served as a battlefield for the much 
greater military conflict and precarious security situation in 
Eastern Ukraine. In 2013 Ukraine imported 25.8 bcm from 
Russia, towards its total annual consumption of 50.3 bcm, 
but from mid-June 2014, Russian gas deliveries under the 
2009 Gazprom-Naftohaz contract were halted. It took until 
the end of October for the EU, Russia and Ukraine to achieve 
a provisional trilateral agreement on a modus operandi for 
the 2014/2015 winter period. For longer-term resolution of 
the conflict over debts and gas prices, Kiev and Moscow have 
started arbitration proceedings – the former on the prices, 
the latter on unpaid bills.
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 Crimean annexation and destabilization in Eastern Ukraine 
are challenging the paradigm of mutual political and eco-
nomic benefits. Nowhere is the impact of the political dete-
rioration as evident as in Germany, where the gas pipeline 
deals of the 1970s were part of Ostpolitik. Positive politi-
cal framing of the gas trade with the Soviet Union/ Russia 
built on ‘change through rapprochement’, later becoming 
the ‘modernization partnership’. In the past, mutual inter-
dependence had paved the way for an ever-closer energy 
partnership. Today, (inter)dependence is viewed as part of 
the problem (by limiting the room for political manoeuvre) 
and no longer as part of the solution (achieving an increas-
ingly close partnership with Russia). The EU has to diminish 
dependency on Russian gas imports, where it creates vulner-
ability and opportunities for political pressure. The best way 
forward is to create a functioning and interconnected EU gas 
market, though. 
Third Piece in the Puzzle: From Interdependence to 
Proactive Diversification?
For the time being, Europe remains dependent on Russian 
gas deliveries. Russia is EU’s main energy supplier, with 
more than 166 bcm in 2013 meeting about 30% of the 
EU’s gas consumption. The levels of the Russian share in 
consumption differ widely across the continent. Russia has 
market power on a continental scale, also because it retains 
the possibility of out pricing other sources of natural gas 
e.g. North American LNG. Moreover, up to the mid-2020s, 
European gas companies have obligations to import at least 
115bcm/a under existing contracts. In sum, the EU’s has lim-
ited opportunities to diversify in short-term, but increasing 
options from mid- to long-term. However, a proactive diversi-
fication will come at significant costs.  EU’s own gas fields are 
depleting. Besides Russia, the traditional suppliers Norway 
and Algeria continue to play a central role. However, Algeria 
has reached a production plateau, and is facing increasing 
internal demand. Norway has some leeway, but here there 
are limits in the short term. The LNG supply is certain to 
improve from 2016/17 onwards, and by 2020 the world 
might even see a surplus. However, LNG will not be cheap. 
Moreover, much will depend on price and demand develop-
ments in Asia. The potential profits are higher there, and the 
region promises growth. 
In sum, sound diversification can be accomplished only 
incrementally. EU’s competitiveness is depending to a large 
extent on affordable and available energy supplies from Rus-
sia as long as the conventional energy system persists. Mutual 
dependence cuts both ways: Russia is heavily dependent on 
the income from its energy exports. Oil and gas – with most 
going to Europe – make up almost 70% of Russian exports; 
they stand for more than 40% of budget revenues, of which 
only about 5%t originates from natural gas. Some 32% of 
Gazprom revenues stem from sales to Europe. The oil price 
slump has been hitting the Russian economy severely. It has 
been estimated that Russia needs an oil price of about USD 
115 per barrel to secure a balanced budget in 2014. For 2015, 
the fiscal break-even point is reported to be at USD 80/barrel. 
The Russian economy is increasingly fragile. Radical shifts 
in energy strategies are to the disadvantage of both sides. 
Russia’s orientation to China with the two pipeline projects 
of Power of Siberia (38 bcm/a) and Altai Pipeline (30bcm/a) 
may be part of  diversification, but the selling-out of Russian 
oil and gas deposits is neither in the interest of Russia nor the 
EU. Energy relations are stalled by geopolitics.
Fourth Piece in the Puzzle: Business as Usual: Immu-
nity or Infection?
If economic rationality prevailed on both sides, neither 
Russia nor the European Union would have any interest in 
endangering their energy relations. But the hope that exist-
ing commercial relations will prove immune to the deteriora-
tion and that business can be separated from geopolitics is 
vanishing. 
Trade relations in natural gas are increasingly affected. 
The embittered atmosphere impeded the EU and Russia in 
solving contentious issues that have been on the table even 
before the Annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine. Since then, bilateral EU-Russian talks to settle these 
issues related to the implementation of Third Market Pack-
ages have been put on hold by the EU Commission. Despite 
of the trilateral preliminary agreement for Ukrainian winter 
supplies, progress has not been sought by the EU on OPAL, 
South Stream or the Antitrust Case against Gazprom. On 
her part, Russia has decided in December 2014 to abandon 
South Stream and to withdraw from the compromise on OPAL 
achieved by the German regulatory authority after the Com-
mission has not given its approval. These developments do 
have an immediate impact on business strategies, corporate 
relations and are contributing to uncertainty and mistrust. 
South-East Europe, Austria and Italy are among the areas and 
countries that must rethink their natural gas strategies after 
the decision to abandon South Stream and to make Turkey a 
major trading hub.  The modus operandi of gas relations is at 
stake. Most likely, 2015/16 will see new clashes on network 
codes and the re-negotiation of new long-term contracts.
 
Business as usual is becoming increasingly difficult as the 
stumbling blocks multiply. Politics/geopolitics are shaped 
by perceptions – and the longer the crisis lasts, the more dif-
ficult will it be to marry them with economic rationalities.
 
Fifth Piece in the Puzzle: The Paradox of 2030 Pack-
age and an Energy Union: Addressing or Squeezing 
Out Natural Gas?
There are principle decisions ahead in EU policies: What role 
for natural gas in the future energy mix? How to re-shape 
external energy relations? When it comes to natural gas the 
two questions are interrelated. Natural gas can contribute to 
decarbonisation but a proactive diversification will increase 
the cost disadvantage gas has compared to coal. In that 
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climate ambitions. Competitiveness is closely related to EU 
access to stable, secure and affordable energy. As Russia is 
a major supplier of oil, gas, coal and nuclear fuel rods and 
reactor technology political values and economic interests 
are running counter to each other. 
Within the EU, the best way forward is an integrated inter-
nal market and a more sustainable energy system. However, 
2014 has produced a highly ambiguous outcome of EU 
policies in that respect. Energy security – primarily related 
to natural gas – has rhetorically dominated the agenda. The 
paradox stems from the 2030 framework to which the EU 
member-states agreed in late October 2014. This allows each 
member-state to continue with its own national energy mix, 
and intensifies ambiguity in energy policies and fragmenta-
tion in EU energy markets. At the same time, an Energy Union 
is envisaged, basing on solidarity, trust and a functioning 
internal market. Greater unity and unanimity are stipulated. 
With respect to natural gas, future EU consumption patterns 
are difficult to foresee. Yet, predictability of demand is a 
necessary precondition to weigh costs and benefits of fur-
ther security of supply provisions. Diversification as well as 
increasing flexibility and resilience internally come at signifi-
cant costs. They are affordable only in European concert. The 
lack of a clear energy and climate policy framework putting 
the EU on a decarbonisation path obstructs effective policy 
steps. The ‘muddling through’ approach makes the EU an 
uncertain partner for (alternative) suppliers of natural gas. 
The EU faces multiple dilemmas.
Conclusions: The Wider Topology of the Puzzle and 
the Necessity for a Blueprint
Putting the pieces of the puzzle together has to take different 
rationales into the picture: Firstly, solidarity within the EU 
has to be preserved.  Relations with Russia and the Russian–
Ukrainian gas conflicts have long been a fulcrum and flash-
point of EU foreign and energy policy. Secondly, assistance 
has to be granted to Ukraine to preserve its statehood and 
sovereignty. This will certainly require lasting political dedi-
cation, and huge political and financial resources. However, 
political stability and economic welfare for Ukraine cannot 
be achieved without Russia, and definitely not against Rus-
sia. The third rationale is to face the fact that Russia will stay 
on the continent, as a neighbour and a gas producer. Achiev-
ing a new modus vivendi for energy relations with a long-term 
vision should be the blueprint.  
Containment in reaction to Russia’s violation of the security 
order has to be hold up, but at the same time the EU and Rus-
sia should avert further damage on energy relations, restore 
back channels for dialogue that allow to ensure smooth gas 
trade. EU and Russia have to re-engage as soon as possible in 
formulating compromises defining a modus of operandi. It is 
increasingly problematic from an energy informed perspec-
tive that energy relations are held hostage of geopolitics. This 
is detrimental to economic relations that have traditionally 
functioned to balancing interests and building confidence.
In a wider perspective, the natural gas challenge is closely 
related to EU’s future foreign and security policies. The 
neighbour hood of the South and Eastern Mediterranean and 
the wider Caspian region (as well as Russia) is of strategic 
importance for European energy supplies. 
Norway is a key partner to the EU and this relationship 
should gain more attention. Norway will have to invest into 
exploration and production in more difficult areas and will 
certainly not do so if the EU does not reduce regulatory and 
political uncertainties surrounding its future climate and 
energy policy. Long-term mechanisms to achieve demand 
and supply security should be developed in a close dialogue. 
Neither Norway nor the EU can simply live on each other’s 
vague promises.
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